The Goal of Retaliation within the WTO

Authors

  • Olga Sergeevna Boklan Russian Foreign Trade Academy

Keywords:

WTO, DSB, dispute settlement system, suspension of concessions, retaliation, equivalency, countermeasures, inducing compliance

Abstract

Enforcement of the decision of the international dispute settlement body very often becomes a problem for the winning party. The mechanism of suspension of concessions within the WTO dispute settlement system is a unique way to make the WTO Members comply with the recommendations of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. However, there are several possible goals of the application of this mechanism. The goal of retaliation can be inducement for the State to comply with its obligations; compensation of the damage caused to the domestic industry and national producers; rebalancing of the concessions provided by the violating state and the injured one; punishment of the violator. The crucial importance of understanding the goal of suspension of concessions is related to the determination of the proper level of retaliation; the standard under which the volume of the suspended concessions shall be considered, as well as the trade sector in which the concessions are suspended. The historical development and the practice of application of the mechanism of suspension of concessions within the WTO dispute settlement system, as well as interrelation of this institution with the relevant provisions of the public international law are analyzed in the present article.

Author Biography

Olga Sergeevna Boklan, Russian Foreign Trade Academy

Place of work, post: Russian Foreign Trade Academy, International Law Department, Postgraduate student

Published

2024-02-08

How to Cite

Boklan, O. S. (2024). The Goal of Retaliation within the WTO. Russian Foreign Economic Journal, (1), 85–100. Retrieved from https://journal.vavt.ru/rfej/article/view/2015

Issue

Section

Research reviews